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A HISTORY OF MIRANDA AND WHY IT 
REMAINS VITAL TODAY* 
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.† 
Lisa A. Rich‡ 
Today, anyone with a television can turn it on—at any time of day or 
night—and find a police officer informing a criminal of his or her 
Miranda rights.1  And as they sit in their comfortable chairs, beverages in 
hand, they can probably recite along with the police officer, “You have the 
right to remain silent. . . .”   
Custodial interrogations and how they are conducted in light of 
Miranda and its progeny are an integral part of the American criminal 
justice process and a necessary tool for criminal law enforcement, not 
merely a source of catchy phrases for today’s popular television shows, 
for a very simple reason:  The warnings set the ground rules for 
custodial interrogations and ensure that the interrogator and suspect are 
on a level playing field.  A review of the case law surrounding the 
Miranda decision reveals that Miranda is a case that has encapsulated the 
nation’s beliefs and, while subject to the ebbs and flows that come with 
an elastic and accommodating form of government, remains a vital 
component of the American criminal justice system. 
I.  STATE OF THE WORLD BEFORE MIRANDA 
While Miranda has become a fundamental part of criminal justice 
jurisprudence, the Court was not covering novel ground.2  The Supreme 
Court had considered issues concerning custodial interrogations and, 
more importantly, confessions for decades leading up to the Court’s 
                                                          
* As part of the Seeger’s Lecture series at the Valparaiso University School of Law, I 
was asked to set the stage for a panel discussion on Miranda and its current role in the 
criminal justice process.  This Article represents an expansion of those remarks. 
†  Mr. Howard is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Troutman Sanders, LLP.  
He served as the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia from 2001, when he 
was appointed by President George W. Bush and confirmed by the United States Senate, 
until 2004.  He is a 1974 graduate of Brown University and a 1977 graduate of the 
University of Virginia School of Law. 
‡  Ms. Rich is the Acting Director of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs at the 
United States Sentencing Commission in Washington, D.C.  She is a 1990 graduate of St. 
Andrew’s Presbyterian College and a 1998 graduate of American University’s Washington 
College of Law. 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 Id. at 442. “We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is 
not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized 
and applied in other settings.”  Id. 
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opinion in Miranda.  For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) routinely gave Miranda-type warnings before they were required 
under Miranda.3  And it was those warnings upon which the Miranda 
Court based its holdings.4  As outlined for the Miranda Court, the FBI’s 
warnings preceded custodial interrogation and informed the subject both 
of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.5 
American jurisprudence regarding the admissibility of confessions 
prior to the mid-1960s was based primarily on establishing the 
“voluntariness” of the confession.6  Over time, the Court recognized two 
constitutional bases for requiring only voluntary confessions to be 
admitted as evidence:  the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.7  Some thirty opinions were issued by the Court applying 
the due process voluntariness test prior to 1964, and those cases refined 
                                                          
3 Id. at 483. 
Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an 
exemplary record of effective law enforcement while advising any 
suspect or arrested person, at the outset of an interview, that he is not 
required to make a statement, that any statement may be used against 
him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney 
of his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel 
if he is unable to pay. 
Id. 
4 Id. at 484. 
“‘The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the FBI to 
both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person has a right to 
say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any statement he does 
make may be used against him in court.  Examples of this warning are 
to be found in the Westover case at 342 F.2d 684 (1965), and Jackson v. 
U.S., [119 U.S.App.D.C. 100] 337 F.2d 136 (1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 
935, 85 S. Ct. 1353.’” 
Id. 
5 Id. at 483.  The FBI noted for the Court that although the timing of the warning had to 
precede the interview, it could take place in a continuum from as soon as practicable after 
the arrest up to the commencement of an interview.  Id. at 485.  “‘The FBI warning is given 
to a suspect at the very outset of the interview.’” Id.; see Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 
684 (1965).  “‘The warning may be given to a person arrested as soon as practicable after the 
arrest, . . . but in any event it must precede the interview with the person for a confession or 
admission of his own guilt.’”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485; see Jackson v. United States, 337 F.2d 
136 (1964); see also United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 
(1964). 
6 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (noting reliance on due 
process analysis for admission of confessions). 
7 Id. at 433. 
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the test into an inquiry that examined whether a defendant’s will was 
overborne by the circumstances surrounding the confession.8   
As the Court later noted, these cases did not offer a “talismanic” 
definition of “voluntariness” that would be mechanically applicable to 
the host of situations where the question has arisen.9  
Rather, “voluntariness” has reflected an accommodation 
of the complex [set] of values implicated in the police 
questioning of a suspect.  At one end of the spectrum is 
the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool 
for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. . . .  At the 
other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting 
society’s deeply felt belief that  criminal law cannot be 
used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the 
possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses 
a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.10   
Therefore, voluntariness was an examination of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession.11  “The 
determination ‘depend[s] upon a weighing of the circumstances of 
pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.’”12 
Throughout the 1960s the Court “changed the focus of much of the 
inquiry” from the due process “totality of the circumstances” approach 
to an “inquiry in determining the admissibility of suspects’ incriminating 
statements.”13  Beginning with its decision in Malloy v. Hogan,14 the Court 
                                                          
8 Id. at 433–34 (citing Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)); see also 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2 (1959) (citing twenty-eight cases decided between 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and Escobedo that dealt with “voluntariness” in 
confessions). 
9 Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 224. 
10 Id. at 224–25. 
11 Id. at 225.  “In determining whether a defendant’s will was overborne in a particular 
case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.”  Id. at 226.  The 
Schneckcloth Court identified several factors that courts had looked at to determine 
voluntariness including: 
[T]he youth of the accused; his lack of education; or his low 
intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional 
rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of 
the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the 
deprivation of food or sleep. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
12 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953)). 
13 Id. 
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switched to a Fifth Amendment analysis, finding that “the Fifth 
Amendment’s Self Incrimination Clause is incorporated into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and this applies to the 
States.”15   
Today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal 
prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in federal 
prosecutions since 1897 when, in Bram v. United States,16 the Court held 
that “[i]n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a 
question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not 
voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person 
‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.’”17 
Under this test, the constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct 
of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether 
the confession was free and voluntary; that is, “‘[it] must not be extracted 
by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied 
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper 
influence. . . .’”18  Two weeks after the Malloy decision, the Court 
outlined the fundamental principles that would become the backbone of 
its Miranda decision.  In Escobedo v. Illinois,19 the Court addressed “certain 
phases” of the “restraints society must observe consistent with the 
                                                                                                                                  
14 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
15 Id. at 1.  In Malloy, the Supreme Court was asked to review its decisions in two prior 
cases in which it had declined to extend Fifth Amendment privilege to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  “We hold today that the Fifth Amendment’s exception 
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against abridgment by the States.  Decisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have 
departed from the contrary view expressed in those cases.”  Id. at 6. 
16 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).  The Bram Court attempted to set limits for 
interrogation resulting in confessions: 
[I]n order to be admissible, [a confession] must be free and voluntary: 
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor 
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the 
exertion of any improper influence. . . .  A confession can never be 
received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any 
threat or promise; for the law cannot measure the force of the influence 
used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and 
therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been 
exerted. 
Id. at 542–43 (citing 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed. 1896)). 
17 Bram, 168 U.S. at 542. 
18 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542). 
19 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”20  As would 
eventually be the case with the defendants in Miranda, the defendant in 
Escobedo was taken into custody and interrogated for four hours for the 
purpose of gaining a confession without the notice of his right to remain 
silent or his right to have counsel present.21  The Escobedo Court 
considered whether, under the circumstances presented: 
[T]he refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request 
to consult with his lawyer during the course of an 
interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of 
Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the 
Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342, 83 S. Ct. 792, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and 
thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any 
incriminating statement elicited by the police during the 
interrogation.22  
The Court concluded that “when the process shifts from 
investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its 
purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to 
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be 
permitted to consult with his lawyer.”23  The Court went on to hold that 
“[t]here is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a 
stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of 
that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice.  Our Constitution, 
unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the 
accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-
incrimination.”24  Thus, the Escobedo Court affirmed a suspect’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during in-custody interrogations, and that 
one’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to 
in-custody interrogations.25  The Court also concluded that the law 
enforcement involved in the Escobedo case were unconstitutionally 
overbearing.26 
                                                          
20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439–40 (1966). 
21 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485. 
22 Id. at 479. 
23 Id. at 492. 
24 Id. at 488. 
25 Id. at 490–91. 
26  Id. at 490. 
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The Escobedo ruling sent ripples throughout the state and federal law 
enforcement communities.  In order to address the Escobedo holding, law 
enforcement employed various haphazard methods to indicate that 
confessions were garnered in accordance with the principles set forth in 
the case.  In Arizona, confessions included a typed statement indicating 
that a suspect had waived his rights at the time of confessing.  It is the 
bureaucratic rubber-stamp waiver that ultimately would be at issue in 
Miranda.  The Court took up four consolidated cases to allow it “to give 
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and 
courts to follow” in the wake of Escobedo.27 
II.  A REVIEW OF MIRANDA AND ITS HOLDINGS 
Miranda v. Arizona28 was a consolidated decision based on four cases, 
three state cases and one federal, which involved custodial 
interrogations.29  In all four cases, the questioning elicited oral 
admissions, and in three of the cases the defendants submitted signed 
confessions.  These confessions were admitted at the defendants’ trials 
resulting in their subsequent convictions.  All but one of the verdicts was 
upheld on appeal.30  Of the four defendants, Ernesto Miranda 
(“Miranda”) has become the most famous, as his case was the one which 
the Warren majority used to demonstrate why its holding was necessary. 
A.  The Facts of Miranda’s Case 
Each of the four cases addressed in the Supreme Court’s Miranda 
opinion involved confessions obtained from the defendant under 
circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege.31  The facts surrounding 
                                                          
27  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441–42 (1966). 
28  See generally id. 
29 Miranda was consolidated with Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of 
Appeals of New York, and Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued from February 28 to March 1, 1966, as well as 
California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued from February 
28 to March 2, 1966.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. 
30 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 518. 
31 Id. at 491.  Each of the four cases consolidated into Miranda were reversed.  In Vignera 
v. New York, the Court concluded that the defendant’s oral admission to a robbery for 
which he subsequently was convicted was obtained without any warnings as to his rights.  
Additionally, the trial judge disallowed defense counsel from raising the issue and 
counseled the jury that failure to give warnings did not invalidate a confession.  Id. at 493–
94.  In Westover v. United States, the defendant was arrested by local authorities who 
subsequently learned from the FBI that he was wanted in another state.  Id. at 494.  Local 
police interrogated him on the night of his arrest and through the next morning.  Id. at 494–
95.  Local police terminated their interrogation and turned the defendant over to the FBI.  
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Miranda’s arrest, confession, and subsequent conviction represent the 
typical case the Court hoped to address with its decision.   
In March of 1963, a young woman was kidnapped and raped in the 
desert outside of Phoenix, Arizona.32  About ten days later, Miranda, an 
indigent Mexican who had dropped out of school in the ninth grade, was 
arrested at his home and taken into custody by the Phoenix police.33  The 
young woman identified Miranda as her attacker, and afterwards 
Miranda was taken into an interrogation room and interrogated by 
police officers for two hours.34  Miranda did not have counsel during this 
custodial interrogation.35   
At the end of the two hours, the two officers emerged with a written 
confession signed by Miranda.36  At the top of the confession was a typed 
paragraph “stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without 
threats or promises of immunity and ‘with full knowledge of my legal 
rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.’”37  
Miranda’s confession was admitted at trial over objection of his counsel.  
After Miranda’s conviction, he was sentenced to a term of twenty to 
thirty years on each count.38 
                                                                                                                                  
Id. at 495.  Nothing in the record indicated that the defendant was warned of his rights by 
local police.  Id.  The FBI gave their standard warnings, but at that point the defendant had 
been in custody for over fourteen hours and his confession shortly after the FBI’s arrival 
was deemed by the Court to be a continuation of the local interrogation with warnings 
coming at the end of the process.  Id. at 496.  The Supreme Court reversed Westover’s 
conviction because the surrounding circumstances did not lead to an assumption that an 
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights had been given.  Id.  In California v. Stewart, the 
Court affirmed the California Supreme Court’s application of Escobedo to Stewart’s 
confession that came during the ninth interrogation session in a five-day period.  Id. at 497.  
During the previous eight sessions, Stewart had maintained his innocence.  Id.  Nothing in 
the record indicated that Stewart had ever been advised of his rights.  Id. 
In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a 
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his 
privilege against self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded 
on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or 
that any effective alternative has been employed.  Nor can a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record. 
Id. at 498–99. 
32 Id. at 518. 
33 Id. at 492, 518.  Psychological tests would later determine that Miranda suffered from 
mental conditions, including sexual fantasies.  Id. at 518. 
34 Id. at 491–92. 
35 Id. at 492. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the testimony of 
the police officers at Miranda’s trial and the government’s response brief 
made clear that Miranda had not been in “any way apprised of his right 
to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the 
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate 
himself effectively protected in any other manner.”39  “The mere fact that 
he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he 
had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’ does not approach the knowing 
and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.”40  
B.  Holding 
The Miranda Court recognized that its holding may be seen as a 
departure from the due process analysis that had been the norm in cases 
leading up to the Malloy and Escobedo cases:   
In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms. 
Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious 
Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the 
slightest. . . .  To be sure, the records do not evince overt 
physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact 
remains that in none of these cases did the officers 
undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset 
of the interrogation to insure that the statements were 
truly the product of free choice.41 
Additionally, although the Miranda opinion itself is long, the holding is  
succinct: 
The prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the 
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  By custodial 
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 492–93 (comparing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1963), and 
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (Douglas, J.)). 
41 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
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custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way.42 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he 
does make may be used as evidence against him, and 
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
retained or appointed.  The defendant may waive 
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.43 
The narrow five-to-four majority holding in Miranda set forth the 
specific warnings that are to be given prior to custodial interrogation and 
set the parameters for what was meant by “custodial interrogation.”  In 
reaffirming Escobedo, the Miranda majority began with the premise that 
applying Fifth Amendment protections to in-custody interrogations was 
“not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but  is an application of 
principles long recognized and applied in other settings.”44  As 
evidenced in its opening paragraphs, the Miranda majority was 
concerned with two interrelated concepts that it had addressed initially 
in Escobedo.  First, defendants in custodial interrogation, particularly 
when faced with state law enforcement officials, were unaware of their 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.45  Second, the Court 
appeared gravely concerned with the defendants’ lack of notice that they 
were entitled to consult with an attorney during the custodial 
interrogation process.46  Taken together, these two interrelated concerns 
amounted to what the Court believed to be “pressure on the suspect 
[that] must be eliminated,” even if that pressure is so subtle as to be 
nothing more than the “influence of the atmosphere and 
surroundings.”47   
The Miranda majority took great pains to trace the history of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and demonstrate that its 
application to custodial interrogations was rooted in the Constitution.  
Indeed, it was held that “[i]n this Court, the privilege has consistently 
been accorded a liberal construction,”48 and the application of the Fifth 
                                                          
42 Id. at 444. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 442. 
45 Id. at 439. 
46 Id. at 440. 
47 Id. at 512 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
48 Id. at 461 (majority opinion). 
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Amendment to in-custody questioning could be “taken as settled in 
federal courts” as far back as 1897.49  The majority stated: 
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the 
privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-
enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.  An 
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police 
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and 
subjected to techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be 
otherwise than under compulsion to speak.50 
Having satisfied itself that its procedural pronouncements were 
governed by the Fifth Amendment, the Court turned to applying its 
holding to state proceedings.  “In Malloy, we squarely held the privilege 
applicable to the States, and held that the substantive standards 
underlying the privilege applied with full force to state court 
proceedings.”51  The implications of that decision “were elaborated in 
our decision in Escobedo . . . decided one week after Malloy applied the 
privilege to the States.”52  Given these decisions, the Court concluded 
that it was a natural progression to apply its procedural safeguards to 
both federal and state law enforcement.  Thus, the Miranda majority 
concluded that: 
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal 
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all 
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in 
any significant way from being compelled to incriminate 
themselves. . . .  [W]ithout proper safeguards the process 
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or 
accused of crime contains inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s 
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise do so freely.53 
Although the Court was clear on what the minimum procedural 
safeguards were to be for individuals taken for in-custody questioning, 
the Miranda majority acknowledged that it could not:  
                                                          
49 Id. (referring to Bram v. United States, U.S. 532, 542 (1897)). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 463–64. 
52 Id. at 465 (citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 467. 
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[S]ay that the Constitution necessarily requires 
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent 
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is 
presently conducted.  Our decision in no way creates a 
constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound 
efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.  
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their 
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of 
protecting the rights of the individual while promoting 
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.54   
What the Miranda Court sought to recognize, therefore, was that 
with the changing scope and methods of law enforcement questioning, 
“reliance on the traditional totality of the circumstances test raised a risk 
of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession . . . a risk [that is] 
unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to 
prove guilt.”55 
C.   The Response to Miranda 
After reviewing the legal foundation upon which Miranda rests, it is 
perhaps easier to understand why so many constitutional scholars 
question the constitutional underpinnings of the Miranda warnings.  
Certainly, following the Miranda decision, many across the country 
believed that the Court had seriously undermined the ability of law 
enforcement to protect the public from criminals.  Many in Congress 
believed that the Court had created a door through which scores of 
criminals could avoid prosecution through technicalities, free to prey on 
the lives of innocent citizens.56 
The Miranda Court welcomed continued action by Congress and the 
states in the area of confessions so long as the minimal requirements it 
set forth were met.57  In direct response to Miranda, and as part of its 
                                                          
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 457; see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000). 
56 See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2123 (“[C]rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals 
who have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere technicalities.”). 
57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.  The Court stated: 
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable 
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the 
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. 
However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in 
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omnibus crime control package, Congress passed legislation in 1968 in 
contravention of the Miranda holding.58  Section 3501 of Title 18 of the 
United States Code 59 was intended to return to the law enforcement 
                                                                                                                                  
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following 
safeguards must be observed. 
Id. 
58 See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2137, 2138: 
The committee is of the view that the legislation proposed in Section 
701 of [T]itle II [18 U.S.C. § 3501] would be an effective way of 
protecting the rights of the individual and would promote efficient 
enforcement of our criminal laws. . . .  [T]he overwhelming weight of 
judicial opinion in this country is that the voluntariness test does not 
offend the Constitution or deprive a defendant of any constitutional 
right. 
Id. 
59 18 U.S.C. § 3501 states: 
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, 
shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such 
confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the 
presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial 
judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be 
admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear 
relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the 
jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves 
under all the circumstances. 
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take 
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the 
confession, including 
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant 
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before 
arraignment, 
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which 
he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the 
confession, 
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was 
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could 
be used against him, 
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to 
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and 
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of 
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. 
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be 
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the 
issue of voluntariness of the confession. 
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District 
of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a 
defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other 
detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-
enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay 
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community the “totality of the circumstances” test, with voluntariness 
being the deciding factor as to the admissibility of the defendant’s 
confession at trial.60  Whether the defendant received his or her Miranda 
warnings was only one factor to be considered by the court when 
assessing admissibility of the confession; a direct reversal of the Court’s 
holding in Miranda.  According to § 3501, courts were to look at a non-
exhaustive list of factors, including whether Miranda-type warnings 
were given, the time elapsed between the arrest and arraignment, and 
whether the defendant was aware of the charges being leveled against 
him or her.61  In the view of Congress, Miranda was an aberration of 
jurisprudence, and its legislative response marked a return to the proper 
balance between the protection of the rights of the accused and the 
                                                                                                                                  
in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or other officer 
empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws 
of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is 
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the 
weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such 
confession was made or given by such person within six hours 
immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the 
time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case 
in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate 
judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial 
judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the 
distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge 
or other officer. 
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in 
evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to 
any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at 
which the person who made or gave such confession was not under 
arrest or other detention. 
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession 
of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement 
made or given orally or in writing. 
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000). 
60 See Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2123 (stating that “there is a need for legislation to offset the 
harmful effects of the Court decisions mentioned above,” including Miranda); Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436 (2000).  In Dickerson, the Court stated: 
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone 
of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the 
instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors 
relevant to the circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to overrule 
Miranda. 
530 U.S. at 436. 
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(1)–(5) (setting forth factors judges were to consider when 
weighing admissibility of confession). 
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promotion of efficient enforcement of criminal law.62  “[The totality of 
the circumstances] approach to the balancing of the rights of society and 
the rights of the individual served us well over the years,” and it is 
constitutional.63 
Section 3501 remained relatively dormant for thirty years while 
federal and state law enforcement implemented the warnings required 
by Miranda.64  Despite dire warnings that Miranda’s requirements would 
bring law enforcement efforts to a halt, prosecutors simply did not rely 
on § 3501.65  However, in 1999, a panel of the Fourth Circuit applied 
§ 3501 and ruled it permissible to use voluntary confessions taken in 
violation of Miranda requirements in federal court proceedings.  In 
United States v. Dickerson,66 the Supreme Court examined the question of 
whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely 
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of 
congressional direction:67   
Given § 3501’s express designation of voluntariness as 
the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any 
warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts 
to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the 
circumstances of a confession, we agree with the Court 
of Appeals that Congress intended by its enactment to 
overrule Miranda.68   
If Congress has such authority, § 3501’s totality of the circumstances 
approach must prevail over Miranda’s requirement of warnings; if not, 
                                                          
62 Omnibus Crime Control And Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2137 (1968). 
63 Id. 
64 See Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test 
for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 511 (2005) (“[Section 3501] 
was largely ignored by federal prosecutors.  Thus, the Miranda warnings requirement 
remained intact simply by default.”); see also Brooke B. Grona, Casenote, United States v. 
Dickerson, Leaving Miranda and Finding a Deserted Statute, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367 (1999) 
(“[Section 3501] has not been used by the Government to challenge confessions, and it has 
not been considered by courts as a replacement for the Miranda warnings.”). 
65 Contrary to concerns cited by Congress that Miranda would demoralize law 
enforcement and “lessen their effectiveness in combating crime,” Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 197) 2128 
(1968), law enforcement adapted to Miranda and its requirements and continued to garner 
voluntary confessions from criminals. 
66 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
67 Id. at 437. 
68 Id.at  436. 
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that section must yield to Miranda’s more specific requirements.69  
However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that Congress “may not 
legislatively supersede [the Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying 
the Constitution”; therefore, the case turned on whether “the Miranda 
court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its supervisory 
authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional 
direction.”70 
Despite the fact that in the intervening years the Supreme Court had 
created several significant exceptions to Miranda’s warnings 
requirement71 and that it frequently referred to them as merely 
“prophylactic” and “not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution,”72 in Dickerson, the Court concluded that Miranda is a 
constitutional decision.73  No constitutional rule is immutable, and the 
sort of refinements made by such cases is merely a normal part of 
constitutional law.74   
The Dickerson Court based its holding on two factors.  First, the 
Court considered Miranda’s application to the states, stating that the 
Court does not hold “supervisory power over the courts of the several 
States” but “is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States 
Constitution.”75  Thus, Miranda’s application to the states indicates that it 
is a constitutional rule, not merely a federal judicial rule of evidence or 
                                                          
69 Id. at 437. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984)).  In Quarles, the Supreme 
Court articulated a “public safety” exception to application of Miranda warnings.  467 U.S. 
at 655.  Under Quarles, the Supreme Court concluded that although the defendant clearly 
was in custody when questioned about the location of a firearm prior to receiving his 
Miranda warnings, “[w]e conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation 
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting 
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”  Id. at 657. 
72 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at  438 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 441 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).  In Elstad, the Court carved 
one of the many exceptions to Miranda by holding that a voluntary confession obtained 
prior to delivery of Miranda warnings did not taint a subsequent confession.  Elstad, 470 
U.S. at 318.  The Seibert Court stated: 
In Elstad, it was not unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at 
the station house as presenting a markedly different experience from 
the short conversation at home; since a reasonable person in the 
suspect’s shoes could have seen the station house questioning as a new 
and distinct experience, the Miranda warnings could have made sense 
as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier 
admission. 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,  615–16 (2004). 
75 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at  438. 
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procedure.  Second, the Court relied on the principle of stare decisis to 
decline to overrule Miranda.  Finding no persuasive force that would 
require departure from precedent, the Court explained:  “Miranda has 
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the 
warnings have become part of our national culture.”76  Also, as Justice 
Scalia has noted, wide acceptance in the legal culture “is adequate reason 
not to overrule” a particular holding.77  Thus, the Court concluded that 
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress could not 
supersede legislatively. 
III.  SEIBERT:  ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT MIRANDA 
Case law since Miranda generally has boiled down the rule on 
custodial interrogations and confessions as such:   
[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a 
waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally 
requires exclusion of any statements obtained. 
Conversely, giving the warnings and getting a waiver 
has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; 
maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though 
given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights 
requires unusual stamina, and litigation over 
voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid 
waiver.78  
However, Miranda continues to be tested by law enforcement in an 
effort to secure confessions while paying homage to the mere letters of 
its holding.  In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. Seibert,79 
which involved a mid-stream application of the Miranda warnings after 
law enforcement had begun questioning the defendant and she had 
confessed.80  The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of what 
was called the “question-first” method.  This law enforcement tactic was 
being adopted by many as a way to circumvent some of the strictures 
placed on law enforcement by Miranda.   
                                                          
76 Id. at 443. 
77 Id. at 444 (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1999)). 
78 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable 
argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law 
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”) (citing Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, n.20 (1984)). 
79 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
80 Id. at 604–05. 
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The “question-first” method was an interpretation of Miranda that 
allowed law enforcement to ask questions of the subject, then Mirandize 
the subject after gaining the information or confession, and immediately 
resubmit the questions, all in a relatively seamless manner.81  Therefore, 
in Seibert, the issue for the Court was whether a post-Miranda confession 
was admissible in light of the near continuous interrogation under which 
it was obtained.82  The Court has had little trouble identifying 
circumstances in which it believed the “important objectives” of law 
enforcement outweighed and did not “compromise Miranda’s central 
concerns.”83  But “[t]he technique of interrogating in successive, 
unwarned and warned phases raises a new challenge to Miranda.”84  The 
object of “question-first” is to render Miranda warnings ineffective 
because officers wait for a particularly opportune time to give the 
warnings or until after the suspect has already confessed.85 
Under “question-first” analysis, the issue becomes whether the 
warnings function effectively as Miranda requires and it is a fact-specific 
analysis in many ways.86  The Court determined that question-first, in so 
far as the facts presented in Seibert were concerned, did not fall into the 
acceptable category of Miranda exclusions: 
Strategists dedicated to draining the substance out of 
Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what 
                                                          
81 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at  611. (“The upshot of all this advice is a question-first practice of 
some popularity, as one can see from the reported cases describing its use, sometimes in 
conformance with departmental policy.”). 
82 Id. at 606–07. 
83 Id. at 619 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
84 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 609. 
85 Id. at 611. 
86 Id. at 616.  The Court discussed the differences between the facts in Seibert and those 
that permitted a confession obtained without Miranda warnings to come in under Elstad 
and articulated circumstances to be considered when judging the effectiveness of the 
Miranda warnings: 
The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series of relevant 
facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream 
could be effective enough to accomplish their object: the completeness 
and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of 
interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the 
timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police 
personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated 
the second round as continuous with the first. 
Id. at 615.  It is important to note that the Court was not applying a “fruits test” to the 
analysis although the “analytical underpinnings of [a fruits approach and that adopted in 
Seibert for Miranda considerations] function similarly in practice.”  Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  The two approaches are “entirely distinct,” as illustrated by the Court  in the 
Patane decision.  Id. 
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Dickerson held Congress could not do by statute. Because 
the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart 
Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced 
confession would be admitted, and because the facts 
here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the 
warnings given could have served their purpose, 
Seibert’s postwarning statements are inadmissible.87 
IV.  WHAT IS THE STATUS OF MIRANDA TODAY? 
Even with the Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda’s constitutional 
underpinnings in Dickerson and Seibert, placing Miranda within the rubric 
of constitutional analysis is difficult.  Clearly, the Miranda Court 
expected the warnings it articulated in Miranda would safeguard Fifth 
Amendment protections against self-incrimination, but only by a bare 
majority.  Perhaps it is true that the Court’s Miranda holding “is neither 
compelled nor even strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth 
Amendment,” and the decision amounted to judicially-created law and 
public policy, as suggested by Justice White in his dissent.88   
It may be that in the post-Miranda world in which law enforcement 
operates today, the true test of the admissibility of a confession is not the 
administration of Miranda warnings, but whether the confession was 
“voluntarily” given pursuant to due process.89  Still others suggest that 
the true constitutional underpinnings for Miranda are found within the 
Fourth or Sixth Amendments.  Perhaps Miranda  is really nothing more 
than a “prophylactic rule”90 to ensure that the penumbra of rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution is protected in criminal proceedings and 
should be limited in its application and scope.91  The Court certainly will 
continue to carve out exceptions to Miranda’s application to custodial 
interrogations leading to confessions as our community evolves and new 
situations present themselves to law enforcement. 
                                                          
87 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (majority opinion). 
88 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
89 See, e.g., Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda, Determining the Voluntariness of 
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. L. REV. 601 (2006) (noting that voluntariness 
considerations remain a major matter in criminal prosecutions). 
90 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636 (2004) (“[T]he Miranda rule is a 
prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause. . . .  
The Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and police do not violate the Constitution 
(or even the Miranda rule, for that matter) by mere failures to warn.”). 
91 Id. at  636–37. 
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However, I posit that at the end of the day, it does not matter 
whether Miranda is a Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment case.  It does not 
matter how one categorizes Miranda; what matters is what it 
accomplishes.  The warnings that evolved out of Miranda are not “but a 
‘form of words’”92 to be pigeon-holed into a particular area of 
jurisprudence, they are the embodiment of the beliefs in this country that 
everyone has rights that must not be curtailed, no matter how laudable 
the goal.  Miranda’s warnings and their effects simply sweep more 
broadly than any one area of jurisprudence.93 
Miranda and its warnings maintain the balance between law 
enforcement and the public at large.  The warnings serve to remind both 
sides of  law enforcement that this country is based on individual rights 
that cannot be overridden—no matter how noble the cause.  Perhaps this 
is a bit strident, but the fundamental fact remains that Miranda warnings 
are designed to ensure that  citizens are both aware of their rights and 
they are given the opportunity to waive those rights in an informed 
manner.  As the Miranda majority stated, the warning that an individual 
has the right to remain silent and that anything she says may be used as 
evidence against her serves “to make the individual more acutely aware 
that he or she is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is 
not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest.”94   
As Justice Clark noted in his partial concurrence in Miranda, 
“detection and solution of crime is, at best, a difficult and arduous task 
requiring determination and persistence on the part of all responsible 
officers charged with the duty of law enforcement.”95  But the 
arduousness of the task cannot run roughshod over the rights of the 
citizenry, and that is what Miranda stands for today.  Whether it is a Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination, or as Justice Clark 
suggested, a due process issue, the warnings set forth in Miranda serve to 
level the playing field and ensure that law enforcement bears the burden 
of doing its job and the citizenry is protected against overbearance.  
Miranda’s warnings are not merely “talismanic incantations” that 
somehow miraculously grant the aura of constitutionality to the fruits of 
                                                          
92 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
392 (1920)). 
93 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 623 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the body of case law acknowledging that Miranda “serves the Fifth Amendment and 
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself”). 
94 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 
95 Id. at 502 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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law enforcement’s efforts;96 rather, they serve as a shorthand reminder 
that all of us may play on the same field under the same set of rules and 
if we choose not to do so, we do so knowingly. 
For the most part, when law enforcement officials approach an 
individual during a criminal inquiry, they rely on two things.  First, they 
count on the human tendency to cooperate and appear willing to 
succumb to authority.  There is a reason why law enforcement personnel, 
such as state troopers, appear to be such an imposing figure when they 
approach a civilian during a traffic stop.  Their uniforms and badges give 
an air of authority; an authority that most of society are trained to obey.  
Second, officers rely upon a civilian’s lack of understanding about his or 
her rights during a criminal inquiry.97  While we can all probably cite the 
Miranda warnings in our sleep thanks to popular television and books, 
law enforcement counts on the fact that a combination of human desire 
to cooperate and uncertainty about the process as a whole will confuse a 
suspect and result in an admission beneficial to law enforcement.98   
The modern day interrogation environment is meant to subject the 
suspect to the will of the examiner, and thus the potential for compulsion 
is evident.99  In the interrogator’s office, “the investigator possesses all 
the advantages.  The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces 
of the law.”100  Thus, even in his Miranda dissent, Justice Harlan 
recognized that the “more important premise [at issue in Miranda] is that 
pressure on the suspect must be eliminated though it be only the subtle 
influence of the atmosphere and surroundings” in which an individual 
                                                          
96 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612 (citing California v. Prycock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)). 
97 Police manuals in use at the time Miranda was decided emphasized this point by 
encouraging law enforcement to remove a suspect from his or her home because in the 
home environment “he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly 
aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions or criminal behavior 
within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other friends are nearby, their 
presence lending moral support.” Id. at 449–50. 
98 As the Miranda majority noted, “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy 
toll on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals.”  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
455. 
99 This fact certainly was not lost on the Miranda majority.  “[C]oercion can be mental as 
well as physical, and [] the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an 
unconstitutional inquisition.”  Id. at 448 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 
(1960)).  The Court noted that police manuals of the day stressed that interrogations should 
take place “in private,” noting that “the ‘principal psychological factor contributing to a 
successful interrogation is privacy—being alone with the person under interrogation.’”  Id. 
at 449 (citing  FRED INBAU & JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 
(Williams & Wilkins Co. 1962). 
100 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450. 
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finds herself being interrogated.101  Unless adequate protective devices 
are employed, no statement can truly be free of choice.102  This is why the 
Seibert majority found that question-first, in the circumstances presented, 
was constitutionally unacceptable.  The warnings, when given 
midstream in a virtually continuous interrogation, did not reasonably 
convey to the suspect her rights as required by Miranda.103 
What Miranda warnings were designed to do, and what this Article 
suggests the Seibert Court emphasized they were intended to accomplish, 
is to strike a balance between law enforcement and the criminal suspect 
that gives the suspect, or any ordinary citizen, a moment to consider the 
rights bestowed upon them by the Constitution and make an informed 
decision about whether to waive those rights.  One can argue that Justice 
Harlan was incorrect when he stated that the Miranda majority “has not 
and cannot make the powerful showing that its new rules are plainly 
desirable in the context of our society, something which is surely 
demanded before those rules are engrafted onto the Constitution and 
imposed on every state and county in the land.”104   
Arguably, society demanded at the time of Miranda, and continues to 
demand, the very procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda and the 
breathing room they provide criminal suspects.  Our history is replete 
with evidence of law enforcement’s efforts to press, pressure, and push 
citizens to gather the confession that can close a case.  It is 
understandable, and to some degree warranted, that police questioning 
“may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek 
advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses.”105  But there must be 
balance.  There must be assurance that the average citizen will not be so 
intimidated, so threatened that in order to remove oneself from the 
situation that she signs away her constitutional rights and confesses 
involuntarily.  That is not the bedrock upon which this country is built.  
As the Escobedo Court so eloquently stated:  
We have also learned the companion lesson of history 
that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive 
if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on 
the citizens’ abdication through unawareness of their 
                                                          
101 Id. at 512. 
102 Id. at 458. 
103 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 
203 (1989)). 
104 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
105 Id.  
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constitutional rights. No system worth preserving 
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to 
consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and 
exercise, these rights.  If the exercise of constitutional 
rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law 
enforcement, then there is something very wrong with 
that system. 106 
Perhaps Miranda’s warnings “do nothing to contain the policeman 
who is prepared to lie from the start,”107 but they do ensure that a 
suspect’s confession is knowingly given.  “Society has always paid a stiff 
price for law and order, and peaceful interrogations is not one of the dark 
moments of the law,”108 but involuntary confessions coerced from 
defendants are not peaceful.  Right or wrong, Miranda “interrogations 
undertaken pursuant to proper Miranda warnings are presumed 
noncoercive; interrogations without such warnings are presumed 
coercive.”109  If the public understands the subtle distinction afforded 
them by the recitation of Miranda’s warnings, then we are all better off. 
“The Miranda rule has become an important and accepted element of 
the criminal justice system.”110  Ultimately, Miranda did not result in a 
lack of confessions.  The law enforcement community has not crumbled 
under its weight.  Law enforcement retains the ability under Miranda and 
its progeny to conduct investigations, question potential suspects, and 
even to get them to confess.  Miranda simply ensures that when an 
individual is deprived of her liberty in any way or taken into custody for 
questioning, certain safeguards are in place so that when a confession is 
obtained, that confession is admissible.  Miranda and its application have 
not remained static.  The Court continues to allow it to evolve and adapt 
so that the compelling interests of law enforcement and the individual 
may remain in balance.  Miranda’s fundamental holding remains sound 
forty years later, and this Article suggests that it will remain vital for 
years to come. 
                                                          
106 Illinois v. Escobedo, 378 U.S. 478,  490 (1964). 
107 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516. 
108 Id. at 517 (emphasis added). 
109 The Supreme Court, 2003 Term Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 306, 313 (2004). 
110 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/6
